A dynamic model of financial markets with learning and adoption is demonstrated to produce episodes of market failure. Traders engage in learning to improve their understanding of the relationship between observed prices and future payoffs. Traders also choose which strategy to employ, one based on fundamental research or one based on extracting information from market data. The two evolutionary processes interact and can produce period in which no equilibrium price exists. How such incidents arise shapes the extreme tail events of the market.
Introduction
Markets are populated by an extraordinary number of traders employing a wide variety of different strategies in the attempt to extract rent through trading. Casual observation of the market suggests there is a lack of agreement among market participant as to the true price determination process. The disagreement extends to issues of market efficiency and how deviations from efficiency can best be exploited. Trading strategies range from those traders who engage in the process of analyzing individual companies, industries, and aggregate economic information to make forecasts of future profits in an attempt to find undervalued securities. Others traders employ the structure of markets in an effort to find and exploit price inconsistencies. Still others employ market-based information as a tool to extract information regarding future price innovations. Of this latter approach, there is near infinite variety in the tools employed, as well as trader offered explanations for how particular signals should be interpreted and why they might work.
The behavior of price in the market reflects the beliefs and trading strategies employed by the traders. This feeds back to shape the beliefs of the traders and affects the traders choice between strategies. The model employed in this analysis captures this interaction between traders and the market price. The model is employed to demonstrate the potential for market extremes and failure as a result trader effort to learn and adopt in this dynamic setting. A financial market model based on a heterogeneous population of traders is examined.
Traders choose one of two strategies capable of generating profits in the model. Traders may engage in fundamental research, which provides each adherent with information concerning the future payments. Alternatively, traders may elect to employ market-based information. The price does contain information, reflecting the demand of the informed fundamental traders that can be employed to generate profit. The traders, though, are required to learn the model for extracting information from the price.
The learning process is one of two governing dynamic processes in the model. The other is the selection of whether to rely on fundamental information or market-based information in devising a trade for the current period. The population proportion evolves over time as traders respond to past performance.
The model offers rich dynamics that provides a narrative of how extreme market prices can arise from the efforts of individual traders to learn and adapt to changing market conditions.
Model

An overview
The market employed in this examination is derived from Goldbaum (2006) . The market consists of two assets, a risk-free bond and a single infinitely lived dividend paying asset. The traders have two strategies for accessing information about the future dividend. They may engage in individual fundamental research or rely on market-based information such as the price.
The financial market developed and employed in this paper offers a number of parallels to the static model of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) . The market includes a group of informed traders and a group of trader who have chosen to forgo direct access to the fundamental information in favor of extracting that information from the price (market data). If the uninformed traders have the correct model for extracting information, then the uninformed strategy offers the higher payoff, thus providing an incentive for traders to free-ride. The paradox is that the ability to free-ride requires that someone else has to do the research.
There are a number of important differences as well. The most notable of the differences is that the current model is dynamic rather than static. In addition, there are a number of structural differences in how the market is established, apart from the dynamics, that play key roles in the behavior of the model in its dynamic setting.
The risky security is infinitely lived and thus the market realization in one period has an impact on the returns offered by the market in the period just before and after. In the tradition repeated Grossman and Stiglitz (GS), the termination of the asset at the end of the period is often retained, making each period's market independent. See, for example Bray (1982 ), Routledge (1996 , etc.). The result is that this model includes is a dynamic process in the price that is absent in GS.
Another deviation from GS is the nature of the private information learned by the informed fundamental traders. In GS, the same private information is shared by all of the informed traders. In the current setting, the GS equivalent information would be to provide informed traders with the value of one of the two random components of dividend. That is, provide ε , but since this is never revealed, the informed traders are all assured of being the uniformly best informed traders in the market. The uninformed trader trade at an information disadvantage, but will be better of at the end of the day if the losses from trade are less than the cost of acquiring the private information directly.
In the current setting, a fundamental trader engages in individual research from which is learned next period's dividend with idiosyncratic error, equation (4) developed below. The fundamental trader's uncertainty is in the error of his or her own signal. The result is a Radner (1979) type market that, when efficient, filters out the idiosyncratic errors of the individual fundamental traders so that the price reveals the underlying information.
There is both a aesthetic and pragmatic advantage over GS. Aesthetically, market-based analysis offers a true advantage if the information contained in the price is less noisy than individual effort of fundamental analysis rather than an arbitrary cost advantage. Certainly, some of the most sophisticated approaches to market-based trading are as effort and cost intensive as is fundamental analysis.
Pragmatically, the nature of the private information also changes the nature of the market solution. In both the GS and Goldbaum models, a fixed mapping between the private information and the price at the rational expectations equilibrium allows the market-based uninformed investor to back the private information out of the observed price. In GS, the rational expectations equilibrium price is a simple function of the private information, 1 ( ) REE t t p f + = θ , so the extraction is simply. It is reasonable to presume trader can find this REE.
In Goldbaum, the relationship between price and the underlying payoff is state dependent.
It depends on the proportion of traders who are informed. Let n t represent the proportion of the market that is fundamentally informed and The market is thus a more challenging environment for the rational trader to exploit through pure deduction, undermining the existence of a REE while offering legitimacy to populating markets with heterogeneous traders employing a variety of strategies and learning from observation.
In addition to the learning process and population process, there are two additional dynamic processes. One is the evolution in the price of the risky asset. This is shaped by the beliefs of each trader group and by their relative proportion. The second is the measure of relative performance that is used by the traders to decide which strategy to employ. All four dynamic processes interact to shape the evolution of the market.
Formal development
A large but finite number of agents, indexed by i = 1, ..., N, trade a risky asset and a riskfree bond. The risk-free bond, with a price of one, pays R. The risky asset is purchased at the market determined price, p t , in period t. In t+1, it pays a stochastic dividend d t+1 , and sells for the market determined price p t+1 . The market participants are aware that the stochastic dividend follows a commonly known AR(1) process centered around d 0 : 
Assume K strategies for estimating payoffs, 1 + t z . In a Walrasian equilibrium, the market price equates supply and demand for the asset. Supply is fixed to avoid the exogenous introduction of noise. For convenience, set fixed net supply of the risky asset to zero. Let N k be the total number of traders employing information 
, be the proportion of the trader population employing strategy k,
. The price p t clears the market by solving
Information
The Fundamental Trader
The estimate of the future payoff is in the nature of Hellwig (1980 A linear projection of η t+1 onto the information set produces the fundamental investor's mean squared error minimizing forecast
where the weight β is known based on the traders' knowledge of the dividend and information processes,
The "fundamental" price prevails in a market populated exclusively by fundamental investors. Derive the fundamental price by using the estimate (5) in (2),
. Price is a function of the current private and public information. For large N, the impact of the idiosyncratic signal noise on the price is negligible. Assume a sufficiently large N such that the t ν term can be dropped.
1
Reflecting a mixture of current public information ( t η ) and private information ( 1 
. When traders receive a perfect noise-free signal on the next period's dividend, the price fully reflects the d t+1
based value producing a Strong-form efficient price.
2
Fundamental traders rely on (6) in forming demand. Plug (6) back into (2) to solve for the average demand of the group of fundamental traders,
Market-based traders
The market-based traders model the relationship between the payoff,
, and current market observables. The traders appropriately estimate
The market-based traders update the coefficients, c t = [c 0 c 1t c 2t ], using the standard recursive updating algorithm for least-squares learning of Marcet and Sargent 1 Formally, ν t is o(1). 2 Efficient market is in the nature of Radner (1979) . The price reflects the aggregation of the fundamental traders knowledge since no individual trader knows d t+1 with certainty.
given (c 0 , Q 0 ). The market-based traders all rely on the same public information, and thus all employ the same forecast, )
. Per capita demand among market-based traders is thus
Price Formation
With K = 2, let n t = F t n , and thus (1-
Use (7), (10), and (11) to solve for the market clearing price. A consistent price function takes the form
, and
Fixed points and attractors
Goldbaum (2006) find the fixed point for each of the dynamic processes in learning and population, but given convergence in learning there is no fixed point to the population process.
Despite the absence of a system wide fixed point, there is an attractor for the system and Goldbaum characterizes the behavior of the market as it converges towards this attractor. This analysis concentrates on the behavior out of equilibrium that can result in market failures.
Learning
Given n, there is a fixed point to the learning process.
Given a population proportion, n t = n, for 0 < n ≤ 1: Note that for n → 0 ) (
Importantly, the equilibrium based on the fixed point to the learning process is dependent on n . In the dynamic setting, this implies At * t t = c c , there is no fixed point to the n t process. The absence of a system wide fixed point undermines the notion of a rational expectations equilibrium. Should such a fixed point exists, it could be deduced by the rational traders, thereby forming an equilibrium. In the absence of such a fixed point to the population process, the trader cannot presume to know n t which, in this setting means they cannot know the values of * ( )
It is a feature of the Walrasian price that t p reflects the beliefs of the traders. When
Biases in belief produce errors in the price,
The positive value of 1t c , the regression coefficient on price, reflects the market-based traders' positively sloped demand function. They interpret an increase in the price as an indication that the informed traders have received good news concerning the future dividends.
Since the demand by the fundamental traders alone produces a price that only partially reflects the future dividend, there is room for the market-based traders to earn a profit from the information they can extract from the price.
To simplify the discussion, it is useful to presume that 2t c is consistent with 1t c according to (16) . This limits regression model error to error in a single parameters. The analysis by 
A price satisfying (11) exists but is of debatable economic importance The dependence of these critical values on n t is a contributing factor to how the market can generate an extreme price. As 1 1 t t c c → , the market-based traders can be characterized as overresponding to price innovations, but as can be seen in Figure 1 
Accounting for forecasting error
Equations (13) and (14) are the parameters of the market clearing price given values of n t and c t . Equations (15) and (17) are the parameters when the market-based traders employ the correct regression parameters given n t , * ( )
. Marcet and Sargent (1989) note the usefulness of the least-squares learning methodology in that the fixed point is also the rational expectations equilibrium. Least-squares learning is a convenient tool for modelers to find the rational expectations equilibrium. It is also a convenient process by which agents in the model can converge to the REE without requiring full knowledge of the market structure. In this case, the learning process offers a mechanism by which the REE implied by the system of equations (15) - (17) can be achieved despite the lack knowledge of n. Traders, in developing an understanding of the market they populate, in forming expectations about returns, and in devising an optimal approach to investing, have to depend on data and observation, rather than deduction.
The solution offered in (15) - (17) Case I: Impose the rational expectations solution. The implication is that the traders know the conditional variance terms despite the lack of access to n t . The importance of the rational expectations approach is that the current market environment is included in the computation of σ . This has a stabilizing effect on the market ensuring a well behaved price. Figure   1 was generated using the n dependent fixed point of 
In Case II and Case III, the fixed estimates of 
Market Efficiency
Let EM t p be the standard against which the market price will be evaluated. Let | |
EM t t p p −
be the measure of market efficiency. In general
From (18), there are two sources of deviation from EM t p . At the learning fixed point,
and thus the first term of (18) b → ∞ and 2t b → ∞ .
Performance
Innovations to population proportion reflect traders perception of which of the two approach offers a trading advantage. Traders use past performance as an indicator of the two strategies' relative advantage.
Let the measure of profits earned by each information source be the excess return realized for the risky asset multiplied by the group average demand:
Based on 
( )
where 2 2 2 2 2
(1 ) (
According to (20), the market-based traders outperform the fundamental traders. With a correct model of the relationship between price and payoff, the fully revealing price is a better source of information than the noisy signal. < < . In this range, their error is sufficiently small so that the information extracted from the price, even with error, still dominates the information derived with error from individual fundamental research. As captured in Figure 1 , the ability of the market to tolerate error diminishes as n t declines. A given error in the model will have a greater market impact the fewer fundamental traders there are to stabilize the price. The result is that the range in which the regression model earns profit shrinks with n t .
Evolution in the population
The Replicator Dynamic produces an evolutionary dynamic population in which the dominant strategy attracts converts from the inferior strategy. The two choice version of the more general K choice replicator dynamic model found in Branch and McGough (2005) results in the transition equation
where ˆF t π and ˆM t π indicate the traders' performance measures of fundamental and market-based approaches, respectively. These are updated according to the process
A number of different functional forms for r exist in the literature. The simulations that follow are based upon
a choice that ensures 0 < n t < 1 for bounded ˆF M t t π − π . Thus, by construction, the discontinuity of n = 0 will never be realized in the simulation. The parameter δ determines how responsive the population is to differences in expected profits.
The key to a well behaved market is to have both of the processes in learning and in population evolve slowly and smoothly to reflect the accuracy of the regression model.
The proportion n t is endogenous to performance. If the market-based strategy performs poorly, n t will increase towards one with the result that the increased proportion of fundamental traders add to the stability of the price. An accurate regression model allows the market-based traders to exploit the information content of the price, earning profits so that n t declines. The narrowing of the profitable range of regression parameters will only arise if the model is sufficiently accurate to support the decline in n t . A slow and smooth decline in n t ensures that the rate of learning is "faster" than the rate of transition in the population. "Faster" learning can be defined as the situation in which the distribution of 1t c narrows faster than does the distance between 1 c − and 1t c + so the probability that 1 1 1 [ , ] t t c c c − + ∉ decreases with time and with the evolution of the market. With this comes the decrease probability that a wildly inaccurate price will be realized.
Two parameters influence the rate and smoothness of the evolution in n t . A large δ means that traders are more responsive to differences in performance, producing large swings in n t from small performance differences. The parameter t μ determines how much emphasis is placed on the current realizations of profits relative to the full simulation history in determining the performance measure.
Evolution in beliefs can also be managed by modifying the least-squares learning process to one that employs constant gains.
as described in Case III, estimating the forecast error from the price solution, but ensuring the existence of 1t c . The result is captured in Figure 2 which plots the last 50,000 observations of the T=500,000 simulation.
There is a slow and steady decline in n t that results in a slow and steady decline in c , never approaching 1t c . Relative to the simulations to follow, the price deviations from efficiency are small. The magnitude of the error does display persistence, reflecting the persistence in the regression parameter deviations from their correct value. The behavior characterized by this sample is also the asymptotic behavior of the market. As described by Goldbaum (2006) , the population proportion, n t , declines in response to improvements to the regression model, but the pricing error remains constant as the impact of the two processes in learning and population balance.
Simulation 2:
In Simulation 2, 10 δ = , creating a substantially more responsive population. The result produces cycles in n t on top of its underlying process of decline. When 1t c is accurate, the market-based trades perform well and n t quickly declines. With the decline in n t , 1t c is no longer accurate and has an upward bias. With this regression model inaccuracy and resulting price error, fundamental performance rises producing an increase in n t , increasing price accuracy and the ability of the market-based strategy to profit. The cycles can be seen in Figure 3 . Though 1t c fluctuates with n t , it never drops below the relatively stable 1t c . This is because even though the swings in n t are large, the process is smooth. Though not shown, the value of 1 1 t t c c + < also fluctuates with n t and once 1t c + crosses below 1t c , the n t process reverse its cycle of decline.
Simulation 3 and Simulation 4:
In these simulations δ is set to 0.1 and traders employ adaptive expectations when determining performance, thus 1 t μ = . In Simulation 3, the traders estimate the forecast errors according to Case III, and in Simulation 4, according the Case IV. For the latter, the traders incorporate the current price in the estimate.
With traders responding to the most recent realization of performance, discrete jumps in n t do occur. This can be seen in Figure 4 , a plot produced by Simulation 3. The short memory in performance produces a noisy n t process. As a result, 1t c is also very noisy producing many realization that are close to or below 1t c . The vertical range of each frame in this figure has been limited in order to reveal behavior between the spike values of price and the parameters. What is observed is reasonably stable fluctuations in the price punctuated with spikes of substantial error.
Within this sample instances of 1 1 t t c c < are realized resulting in the absence of a reasonable market clearing price, but with adaptive expectations, the impact on n t of the infinite profits to the fundamental traders is short lived.
The equivalent figure produced from Simulation 4 looks nearly identical. The difference is in the magnitude of the deviations from normal experience at each of the spikes that extend outside of the frame. The tempered demand of the market-based traders keeps the price finite and reduces the extreme prices realized when 1t c is close to, but still greater than, 1t c .
The market characterized in both these simulations is one in which the market-trader beliefs are generally consistent with the prevailing market. On rare occasion, the market shifts so that these same beliefs lead to market failures. Figure 5 looks at a short 50 periods during which one of these spikes occurs. Just before the spike, there is a period of decline in n t that bring 1t c close to the prevailing 1t c . The decline in n t was the result of a self-reinforcing (negative) price bubble. The decline in the price was fueled by the upward bias in 1t c relative to the declining 1t c . The shifts in the population to the market-based strategy pushed the price further out of line from fundamentals, but continued to generate returns for the market-based strategy.
Simulation 5: Simulation 5 has 1/ t t μ = but the least-squares learning is switched to one of constant gains. Equation (9) becomes
. The result is regression parameter estimates that put greater weight on the most recent observations with λ setting the rate of decay. This market is characterized by a population that is stable within a short time frame. For extended period, the market-based strategy produces small but regular profits. On rare occasions, the market requires a great deal of accuracy in the regression model employed by the market-based traders, but because of the short memory employed in estimating the model, this accuracy cannot be consistently produced. The result is substantial mispricing that offers short lived but substantial profits to the fundamental strategy.
Simulation 6: Simulation 6 incorporates short memory in both processes with 1 t μ = and λ = 0.01.
As seen in Figure 7 , The noise in both the population process and the regression coefficients again combine to produce sustained periods of a reasonable well behaved market with spikes of varying magnitude generated by realizations of 1t c near to or in excess of 1t c .
Conclusion
Extreme market prices and even the absence of a market clearing price are the produce of trader efforts to learn and adapt to the changing conditions that arise in the market they populate.
That the changing market condition is the product of the own evolution perpetuates the problem.
As simple and reasonable as is the underlying market employed in this analysis, a rational expectations equilibrium cannot be presumed. Traders must form beliefs about price formation and the profitability of different strategies based on market observation and experience.
It is possible to produce a well behaved market, one in which the pricing errors are small resulting from shocks information shocks rather than model error. A slow and measured response by market participants to new information creates the stability necessary for the trades to develop an accurate understanding of the price formation process. Somewhat surprisingly, the population can be highly sensitive to performance, producing fairly large cycles in the population without adversely affecting price accuracy, as long as the transitions in the population are smooth.
It is common practice for traders to place greater weight on more recent observations. This is reasonable for a market that experiences changing conditions. The short memory contributes to the instability to which the traders are trying to adapt. The result is a market that can produce substantial mispricing. 
